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Executive Pay and Performance in the UK 1994-2002 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between executive cash compensation and 
company performance for a sample of large UK companies over the period 1994-
2002. This relationship is examined against a background of a series of reports into 
corporate governance mechanisms in UK companies. We show that base pay 
compensation of UK executives has increased substantially over this period, and we 
provide evidence on the movement in the pay-performance sensitivity over time. We 
identify an asymmetric relationship between pay and performance: in years and for 
companies in which stock returns are relatively high, pay-performance elasticities are 
high, but we find that executive pay is less sensitive to performance in those cases 
when stock returns are low. This suggests that overall there is little relationship 
between pay and performance.  We also explore the heterogeneity of the pay-
performance relationship across firms, and find that board structure, firm size, 
industry and firm risk are all significant determinants of executive compensation. 
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I Introduction 
In this paper we document the substantial increase in UK executive’s base pay over 
the period 1994-2002, and examine the pay-performance relationship between 
executive compensation and corporate performance in the UK over this time. 
Executive compensation in the UK has received increasing attention, with the 
publication of a number of corporate governance reports, and our paper is a 
longitudinal study of UK executives’ pay, providing an assessment of the effect of 
these reports on the pay-performance relationship over time. The sample period is an 
ideal testing ground, because of the dramatic increases in stock returns during the late 
‘nineties, and the subsequent fall in stock returns after the millennium.  
 
A series of reports throughout the nineteen nineties recommended changes to the 
governance of UK companies. These recommendations have included: splitting the 
roles of chairman and chief executive (Cadbury (1992)), the disclosure of executive 
pay and the setting up of remuneration and audit committees (Greenbury (1995)), the 
numbers and responsibilities of non-executive directors on the board (Hampel 
(1998)), independence of non-executives (Higgs (2003)).  Greenbury (1995) in 
particular suggested greater disclosure of executive pay and stronger scrutiny over the 
setting of executive compensation and emphasised that incentive compensation should 
have strict performance criteria.  In our work we focus on the cash compensation part 
of an executive’s total compensation package, since as we show below this has 
increased substantially over the period. Notwithstanding the role of incentive shares in 
aligning the interests of executives and shareholders, and ensuring that total 
compensation is more sensitive to firm performance, the growth in base compensation 
is dramatic, and understanding the relationship between base pay and performance is 
important and relevant. 
 
Murphy (1999) provides a general overview of the literature, methodology and issues 
in executive compensation, starting from the influential study of Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), who first identified the pay-performance puzzle: that there is little relationship 
between executive pay and company performance. Conyon et al (1995), Main et al 
(1996) Conyon (1997) and Benito and Conyon (1999) have confirmed these low pay-
performance sensitivities (PPS) for UK firms, with typical elasticities of around 0.15.
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Instead, past research has found that firm size seems to be dominant in determining 
the level of executive pay.  In a comparison of US and UK firms, Conyon and 
Murphy (2000) found a pay size relationship of 0.32 for US firms and 0.2 for UK 
firms.  
 
Murphy (1999) draws a distinction between cash compensation, which includes base 
salary and annual bonuses, and total compensation, which adds in incentive 
components such as stock options and LTIPS.  Most of the early UK literature relates 
to only cash compensation due to the difficulty of obtaining information on incentive 
based compensation. Main et al (1996) found that the inclusion of share option value 
increased the pay-performance elasticity from 0.15 to 0.71 for the total board 
remuneration and from 0.23 to 0.9 for the pay of the highest paid director.  This 
translates into a cash compensation increase of £8,018 for the highest paid director 
compared with an increase of £50,600 in total compensation at the 1989 median level 
of pay, following a 10 per cent increase in shareholder return.  This demonstrates that 
the inclusion of incentive components leads to a much greater increase in the 
directors’ wealth. McKnight and Tomkins (1999) estimated higher estimates of PPS 
for total compensation, but this may attributed to the fact that they used a heuristic 
approach as opposed to Black-Scholes, to value share options.  Conyon and Murphy 
(2000) document a shift from stock options to more performance based incentives 
such as LTIP’s, which is consistent with Greenbury’s recommendations. Bruce et al 
(2003) argue that it is essential that LTIPs be included in the estimation of pay-
performance sensitivities, but recognise that including LTIPs and share options will 
have a “mechanical relation to performance conditions”.
2
 In the current paper, we 
focus on the pay-performance sensitivity with respect to cash compensation, since 
aside from any incentive payments, we report below the growth in base pay of UK 
directors is well above the level of inflation and wage growth. 
 
There is conflicting evidence as to whether the pay-performance relationship has 
weakened or strengthened over time.  In the US Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggested 
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 Early UK studies such as Gregg et al (1993) found cash compensation elasticities of less then 0.05. 
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 Buck et al (203), page 1714. Renneboog and Trojanowski (2003) find that by including a variable for 
managerial turnover, the pay-performance relationship is strengthened. 
 
that PPS had weakened since the 1930’s.  In contrast Hall and Liebman (1998) found 
that PPS had more than doubled since 1981.  Gregg et al (1993) in the UK found the 
pay-performance relationship had weakened between 1983 and 1991, whereas Benito 
and Conyon (1999) suggested it had strengthened between 1985 and 1995. Conyon 
and Nicolisas (1998) looked at a sample of small to medium firms using cash 
compensation, and found that smaller firms had a weaker pay-performance sensitivity 
than found in studies featuring larger listed companies.  Conyon and Sadler (2001) 
examined individual pay-performance sensitivities in and across firms as opposed to 
an average across all firms. They found that PPS varied across directors between and 
within firms.  Also firms that have stronger corporate governance structures tend to 
have higher pay-performance sensitivities (see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)). A 
contribution of the current paper is to assess the movement in the pay-performance 
relationship from the mid-nineties onwards. 
 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggested that there is little evidence that relative 
performance to other firms in the industry is an important source of managerial 
incentives.  In contrast in their comprehensive study of Relative Performance 
Evaluation (RPE), Gibbons and Murphy (1990) established that both industry and 
market relative performance played a role in shaping executive pay.   They found that 
market performance had a stronger effect then relative industry performance using a 
large sample of 9,425 firm years over 1974 to 1984.  Studies in the UK that have 
explored RPE have found insignificant results. Main et al (1996) found sector 
performance (rather then market performance) was insignificant but had a negative 
sign.  Benito and Conyon (1999) also included relative performance, which was 
negative but insignificant.  
 
Other factors considered in the literature include level of firm risk and corporate 
governance measures.  Argarwal and Samwick (1999) reports that the level of firm 
risk (firm return variance) is an important determinant in the level of remuneration 
and this was robust across other measures of firm risk.  By not allowing for the level 
of firm risk the pay-performance relationship will be underestimated.  Firms are more 
likely to tie executive remuneration to that of the market when the firms return is less 
volatile in relation to the market.  Garen (1994) showed that firms with higher levels 
of risk (as measured by betas from a regression of firms’ return on the market return) 
paid their executives more in salary and less in incentive payments.  This fits with 
principal agent theory since risk-averse executives should demand higher base salaries 
and less performance-related pay when risk is high, in order to avoid the risk.  Core et 
al (1999), Conyon and Murphy (2000), Conyon and Sadler (2001) and Garvey et al 
(2003) have tried to incorporate some form of risk element in their determination of 
executive pay. 
 
Conyon (1997), Bentio and Conyon (1999), and Girma et al (2003) found very little 
evidence of corporate governance changes effecting the level and structure of CEO 
pay.  These studies have shown the majority of firms have complied with the 
suggested recommendations such as splitting the role of the chairman and CEO, 
setting up a number of committees such as a remuneration, nomination committee but 
it appears it has done very little to change the level of pay or alter the pay-
performance sensitivity.  Girma et al (2003) found little change in the PPS after 
Cadbury except a slight increase for the largest firms and firms in the low pay 
quartiles.  
 
 
II Methodology 
Following Murphy (1999) the standard pay-performance relationship is obtained from 
the following regression: 
 
(ExecPAY)it  = γ i + αt + βi(CompPerformance)it + λi(Controls)it + εit 
 
γi refers to a executive/firm specific effect for the executive(s) working in firm i that 
varies across all executives/firms but is constant across time and αt is a time trend. 
Measures of company performance that have been used previously include 
shareholders’ wealth/return, earnings per share, and sales revenues.  Control variables 
will include firm size, time dummies, number of directors and the number of non-
executive directors.  Pay may be defined as either the total board pay or the pay of the 
highest paid director. 
 
Since the sample is a cross section of firms of varying sizes and from different 
industries there are likely to be time invariant unobserved differences between firms, 
which may explain some of the variation in pay.  Examples of unobserved time 
invariant effects include director quality, and complexity of the firm.  In order to 
allow for this unobserved heterogeneity, the model will be estimated using fixed 
effect regressions. A fixed effects regression is preferred to a random effects model 
since the unobserved effects are likely to be correlated with explanatory variables, 
such as firm size.  Many past studies have used a first differenced approach to remove 
the fixed firm effects.  The fixed effects approach removes the unobserved 
heterogeneity across firms, and so concentrates on those variables that change over 
time.  With the fixed effects methodology, observations are transformed by 
subtracting the group mean and running OLS on these transformed variables.  Since 
we can’t distinguish between unobserved effects and time invariant observed 
variables the industry dummies can only be included in a random effects model. 
 
III Data  
1. Sample 
There are two main data sources; Hemscott director trading dataset and Datastream.  
The data sample consisted of 415 companies that were constituents of the FTSE 350 
stock market index over the period January 1994 to September 2002.  This list 
included all those companies that were constituents of the index at the end of the 
sample period on 23
rd
 September 2002; plus all companies that had been constituents 
of the FTSE 350 during the period 1994-2002, but who had since become members of 
the FT Small Sectors or Fledgling Sectors; plus those companies that were de-listed 
from the FTSE 350 index for reasons such as bankruptcy or takeovers. In this way, the 
construction of the sample removes any concerns about survivorship bias. 
 
Investment trust firms were excluded, as were firms that had less then three years 
worth of return/account data and other firms that had data unavailable from 
Datastream. Panel A of Appendix 2 gives details on how the final sample of 415 firms 
was constructed. Panel B in Appendix 2 shows the distribution of firms across fiscal 
years, where companies are allocated to a fiscal year by the date of their accounting 
year-end.  There will not necessarily be 350 firms in any year, since firms may have 
left the FTSE 350 but still be a member of the LSE or firms may have unavailable 
data.  The first and last year will have relatively fewer firms since many firms may not 
have complete accounting year data if their relevant account year started/finished 
outside the sample period.   
 
2. Dependent Variables 
For each company in the dataset, we collected two measures of directors’ 
compensation from Datastream annual company accounts: the total remuneration of 
the whole board and the pay of the highest paid director. Total board pay (Datastream 
code 126 (£’000s)) includes the total of directors fees, emoluments for management 
services and pensions or pension fund contributions paid to, or on behalf of directors.  
Following the introduction of FRS3 (June 1993), compensation for loss of office and 
ex gratia payments are included. Pay of the highest paid director (Datastream code 
244 (£’000s)), represents the highest amount of remuneration paid to any director for 
the period.   It may apply to a different director each year, and again the amounts 
include pension contributions and bonuses.  
 
3. Accounting Years  
The directors’ compensation variables are annual payments relating to the company’s 
accounting year. The cross-sectional units in the panel were aligned on the basis of 
fiscal years, since UK firms have different accounting years, and it is necessary to 
standardise by year for comparison purposes. The fiscal year runs from early April to 
late March each year, and firms were allocated to the relevant fiscal year by the date 
of their accounting year-end. A company with an accounting year-end in February 
1995 would be allocated to the 1994/95 fiscal year, but a company with a year-end in 
May 1995 would be allocated to the 1995/96 fiscal year.  
 
One problem in allocating firms to fiscal years was that some firms changed their 
accounting year-ends during the sample period.  There are two types of firms that 
changed their accounting years: a) those that changed their accounting year to a later 
date in the accounting year e.g. September 1999 to December 1999; and b) those that 
changed their accounting year to an earlier date in the accounting year e.g. September 
1995 to June 1995. We annualised data where the reported data was for an accounting 
period different to 12 months.   
 
4. Explanatory variables 
a) Firm Size 
Total firm sales is used as a proxy for firm size in the regressions since the majority of 
prior studies have found this to be the most important determinant in the level of 
executive compensation.  Although market capitalisation is a reasonable measure of 
firm size, it will be correlated with total shareholder return.
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  Past studies have shown 
that performance tends to be negatively related to firm size.  
 
b) Firm Performance 
The main measure of company performance used is total shareholder return, since the 
purpose of performance related pay is to align the interests of the directors with those 
of the shareholders. We also look at alternative accounting measures of performance 
such as earnings per share, return on assets and growth in sales.  Although the past 
UK research has found little evidence of relative performance evaluation, we include 
market and industry adjusted returns.  
 
Total shareholder return was calculated as an annual value by accounting year as 
opposed to calendar year. Annual returns were calculated for each company by 
cumulating the standard daily return, defined as the percentage change in close-to-
close share price plus the dividend payment on the ex-dividend date. Main et al 
(1996), and Conyon (1997) have calculated annual return by the log of the change in 
the return index over the whole year.  Instead we follow Barber and Lyon (1997) and 
compute annual abnormal returns as the buy and hold return (BHAR) minus the buy 
and hold return on a reference portfolio as opposed to the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR). 
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This paper uses the BHAR approach and cumulates daily returns on an annual basis to 
give total shareholder return for the particular account year.  Market and industry 
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 When market capitalisation was used as a firm size proxy in the regression model the sign on the 
return variable was negative.  The coefficient on both firm size proxy variables were quite similar with 
market capitalisation having a slightly smaller coefficient. 
adjusted returns are the actual return minus the expected return. Expected returns are 
calculated using a CAPM style model.  This runs a regression of the firm’s daily 
return on that of the daily market return  
 
Rit = αi + βi RFTt + εit  
 
The parameters from this regression can be used to calculate expected return i.e. 
E(Rit)= αi + βi RFTt  where RFT is the actual daily return on the market index. To 
obtain the parameter estimates we ran regressions on the daily returns for the year 
prior to the accounting year.  This results in approximately 255 observations in each 
regression. For the first accounting year, we used in-sample estimates of the 
coefficients.  In the case where firms had changed their accounting years, we 
estimated the parameters over the full year prior to the new accounting year.  The 
exactly same method is used to obtain expected returns for the industry adjusted 
returns except regressions are run using the return on the industry index to which the 
firm belongs.  The industry groups used are defined in panel A of appendix 3. 
 
c) Board composition and Structure 
Different firms will have different board sizes and composition, which may influence 
how much they pay their whole board. Main et al (1996) used total board 
remuneration to control for the number of directors and the composition of the board.  
Core (1999) and Cosh (1997) have explored the issue of executive compensation and 
the structure of the board though both in the context of an individual director’s pay 
rather then the whole board.  Core (1999) found that larger boards paid their CEO 
more in terms of both cash compensation and total compensation. They also found 
firms with a higher proportion of non-executives meant the CEO was paid more.  
Cosh (1997) using a set of UK firms also found that firms with a higher proportion of 
non-executives paid their CEO more.  These findings contradict the predictions from 
agency theory.  If the number of non-executive directors is used as a proxy for the 
level of monitoring then one would expect that the pay of the CEO/ highest paid 
director would be less. Other studies have found there appears to be very weak 
relationships between corporate governance structure and executive pay and the pay-
performance relationship. 
 
There are two measures of board structure that are included: the total number of 
directors, and the proportion of the non-executives on the board. Firms that have more 
directors (particularly more executive directors) may pay their whole board more 
simply because they have more directors to pay.  A firm may increase total board pay 
in one year because there are additions to the board rather then any pay increases to 
the existing members, and this needs to be controlled for.   A larger board size may 
also suggest the firm is more complex hence the need for more (higher quality) 
directors, who will demand more pay . 
 
Non-executive directors only receive fees for their services, and so are paid 
considerably less then the executive directors on the board.  If there were a greater 
proportion of non-executives one would expect the total board pay to be less (given 
board size is kept constant). Also more non-executives may cause directors to be paid 
less due to greater monitoring.  Various corporate governance reports such as 
Greenbury (1995) have recommended that the remuneration committee comprise 
solely of non-executive directors. An increase in the proportion of non-executives 
may reflect this fact and therefore since the non-executives are setting the level of 
executive pay, pay may be lower.  
 
It is difficult to predict the effect board size and composition would have on the pay 
of the highest paid director.  If there are more directors on the board then the highest 
paid director may have more responsibility in running a larger possibly more complex 
board/firm.  On the other hand there may be more executives to take on the major 
roles so the highest paid director has less responsibility and therefore require lower 
remuneration since all executives in the firm receive similar pay.  The Cadbury report 
(1992) recommended that roles should be distributed among executives so not one 
individual has all the power.  Again a higher proportion of non-executive directors 
may imply greater monitoring so directors pay is set at a lower rate. Alternatively if 
there are few other executive directors the highest paid director may have more roles 
and responsibility and actually require higher remuneration.   
 
d) Time and Industry Dummies  
Time dummies are included to allow for macroeconomic shocks, and a variable for 
each industry group was created.  Conyon and Murphy (2000) used only four 
categories of industry group: mining and manufacturers, utilities, financial services 
and other. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) include industries by SIC code, but this would 
result in too many industry groups, which would give little explanatory power since 
there would be few observations for each industry.  In the Hemscott dataset the firms 
industry group is defined as the FTSE actuary industry group.  These were grouped in 
the 10 industry groups, as detailed in Appendix 3. Most firms in the sample are in the 
cyclical service group, which makes up almost a third of all observations. The least 
populated industry with only six firms is the cyclical consumer goods. 
 
5. Inflation 
Since the dataset is a panel over several years, the effects of inflation on the variables 
needs to be allowed for.  All nominal variables were inflated to 2002 values by the 
monthly retail price index RPIX, excluding mortgage payments.   
 
IV Overview of Directors Remuneration: Descriptive Statistics 
The sample of 415 firms is an unbalanced panel in that some firms leave the sample 
before the end and others join the sample midway through.  The total number of 
observations (firm years) is 2,859 but some observations may have missing values for 
some variables.   Panel C in Appendix 2 shows the distribution of the number of 
observations per firm year, with the average number of firm years being 7.  Over half 
of firms (239) have the maximum possible years of 8 with only about 21% of firms 
having less then 6 years.  There were 14 firms that had a fiscal year missing due to 
changing of account year-ends.  There were 18 firms that had an account year that 
was greater then 12 months that had annualised data from Datastream and their 
returns were subsequently adjusted. 
 
Table 1 Panel A gives a summary of the pay variables in real terms. The mean of both 
the total board pay and that of the highest paid director is much greater then the 
median, which suggests that both pay variables are right skewed with a few firms 
having unusually large values.   The large standard deviations for both pay variables 
demonstrates there is a wide spread of pay levels across time and between firms in our 
sample.  Figures 1 and 2 show the changes in the average of the real value of total 
board pay and the pay of the highest paid director across the sample period. 
 
Figure 1: Average Total Board Real Pay 1994/1995-2001/2002
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Fig. 1.  Average real total board pay 1994/1995-2001/2002, pay is cash compensation (salary, bonus 
and pension contributions) and is inflated upwards to 2001/2002 fiscal year prices. 
 
Over the whole period there has been a general rise in the average pay of the total 
board with a slight fall in the 2001/2002 accounting year.
2
  The mean total board pay 
for the sample firms has risen by 33% and there has been a 30% rise in the median 
pay, all in real terms.  This means in real terms on average the mean and median pay 
has risen by 4.7% and 4.3% respectively per annum.  The gap between the median 
and the mean is quite wide and has widened over the sample period. 
 
In figure 2, again there is an obvious difference in the mean and median of the highest 
paid director. Over the sample period there has been a big increase in the average pay 
of the highest paid director except in 2001/2002 where the mean pay fell slightly.  It is 
evident that there has been a widening of the gap between the mean and the median 
since 2000.  Over the entire period 1994/1995 – 2001/2002 mean pay of the highest 
paid director has risen by 60% and median pay by 45% in real terms.  This is an 
average annual growth of 8.6% and 6.4% for mean and median pay respectively 
above inflation.  These figures suggest that the average pay of the highest paid 
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 A similar pattern was found when the pay variables were adjusted for wage growth as opposed to 
inflation. 
Figure 2: Average Real Pay of The Highest Paid Director 1994/1995-
2001/2002
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Fig. 2. Average real highest paid director pay 1994/1995-2001/2002, pay is cash compensation (salary, 
bonus and pension contributions) and is inflated upwards to 2001/2002 fiscal year prices. 
 
director has been growing at a faster rate then that of the total board pay.  This is also 
reflected in the slight growth in the ratio of the highest paid director pay to the pay of 
the total board.  In the 1994/1995 fiscal year the average ratio was 0.274 but by 
2001/2002 fiscal year it had risen to 0.318. 
 
Not only are directors getting pay rises well above inflation levels but these are much 
greater then those of the average employee in their firm.  In our sample on average the 
average director in a firm earns 11 times more then an average employee in that firm 
and this ratio has been rising over the sample period (in 1994/1995 it was around 9 
times and by 2001/2002 it was 12 times).  Whilst over the sample the average board 
pay has risen by 33% and the highest paid director by 60% the average employee 
costs has only risen by 11.72%. in real terms
4
.    
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 The only measure of employee wages obtainable from Datastream is total employee costs.  This 
includes all wages and salaries, social security costs and pension costs of all employees including the 
directors.  Since we know the pay of the directors this can be removed and an average cost per 
employee can also be worked out since we know the total number of employees and the total number of 
directors.  The only problem is we cannot separate the social security costs (employers national 
insurance) from the employment costs so this may inflate the average employees wage slightly. 
Exhibit 1 shows a comparison of pay growth in the mean of the cash compensation for 
the total board and highest paid director with that of all employees and management 
pay growth from the Annual Survey of Hours of Earnings (ASHE).
4
 
 
ASHE is a representative sample (about 1% of the working population) of employees 
in the UK, available from 1999 onwards. Exhibit 1 shows that over the period 1999-
2002 executive pay has risen much faster than that of managers and senior officials 
and more then double that of all employees in the UK.  The evidence we are 
documenting is that executive cash compensation has grown considerably during our 
sample period and by more then any comparable group. 
 
Figure 3 shows the percentage change in both pay variables along with the percentage 
change in the FTSE all share index for the sample fiscal years 1994/1995 – 
2001/2002. The change in both pay variables appears to follow that of the market 
index with a slight lag. This may reflect that the largest component of cash 
compensation, salary, is set at the beginning of the accounting year.  Some of the 
growth in pay over the period may therefore be attributed to the growth in the stock 
market.   This large pay growth over the sample period we have documented may be 
attributed to the fact that between the 1996 and 1999 fiscal years the stock market 
grew by 58%. We will explore these issues in more detail in the regression results in 
Section V below. 
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 Exhibit 1 
Pay Group Mean Real 
Pay 
Growth 
1999-2002 
Total Board Pay 19.90% 
Highest Paid Director 25.75% 
Managers and Senior Officials 15.30% 
All Employees 9.50% 
 
Exhibit 1: Comparison of growth in mean real cash compensation of the total board and highest paid 
director with managers and all employees from Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHES). 
Source: Datastream and www.statistics.gov.uk. 
 
Figure 3: Change in Pay and FTSE All Share Return 1995/1996-
2001/2002
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Fig. 3.  A comparison of the percentage changes in both pay variables and the total return of the FTSE 
all share index 1995/1996-2001/2002, pay is cash compensation (salary, bonus and pension 
contributions) and is inflated upwards to 2001/2002 fiscal year prices. 
 
The trend to having more non-executive directors on the board identified by Peasnell 
et al (1998) and Young (2000), is confirmed in figure 4 and Table 1 Panel D which 
shows the average composition of a company’s’ board. 
 
Figure 4: Average Board Size 1994/1995-2001/2002
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Fig. 4.  Average board size, number of executives and number of non-executives 1994/1995-
2001/2002. 
 
On average there are approximately nine members on the board and this has remained 
fairly constant throughout the time period.  However the composition of the board has 
changed slightly.  In the 1994/1995 account year the majority of the board were 
executives, but by the 2001/2002 account year non-executive directors were n the 
majority, on average. In 1995 44.5% of a firms board comprised of non-executive 
directors but by 2002 fiscal year this had risen to over half at 53.6%.  The proportion 
of non-executives on the board seems to be higher in the FTSE 100 companies then 
the FTSE 250 companies.  In the fiscal year of 2002 on average 57.1% of board 
members were non-executives compared to 51.6% in FTSE 250 companies.    
  
These changes probably reflect the impact of the corporate governance reports such as 
Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995), which highlighted the importance of, and 
recommended an increase in, the number of non-executive directors.  Hampel (1998) 
recommended that the board should comprise at least a third of non- executives, and 
Higgs (2003) recommended that at least half the board should be non-executives.  
From the above evidence it appears this is already the case, particularly in the FTSE 
100 companies.  Since the average board size has not changed, the evidence in figure 
4 suggests that firms have increased the number of non-executives at the expense of 
executive directors.  This would imply that the total board pay should have decreased 
slightly since non-executives are paid much less then executive directors.  Since total 
board pay has increased the increase in executive pay will be underestimated since 
this implies that the executives must be receiving a larger increase in pay for the pay 
of the total board to increase.  
 
Table 1 Panel B reports two measures of firm size: market capitalisation and total firm 
sales. The average market capitalisation adjusted for inflation is £3147.98m with only 
a median of £659.75m.  The mean total sales are £2,318,285,000 with a median of 
£634,061,300. Both measures are highly skewed with a few firms being very large.  
The standard deviations of both size variables suggest there is a large range in firm 
size.  This removes any worries of there being a firm size bias in only using the FTSE 
350 firms since there is plenty of firm size variation. 
 
V) Regression Results 
A list and description of the variables used in our regressions can be found in 
Appendix 1. All regressions were performed on both the pay of the whole board and 
that of the highest paid director.  First, the firm’s raw return is included as the 
company performance explanatory variable with the inclusion of adjusted return 
measures later.  Following the approach in Murphy (1999) stock market performance 
variables were entered in the model in the form ln(1+return), and total sales was 
included in log form to reduce the effect of outliers in firm size.  In all the regressions 
the control variables of total sales, number of directors and proportion of non-
executives are used. Year dummies are included to allow for any aggregate effects 
that aren’t constant over time such as macro economic shocks.  Industry dummies 
allow for any possibility of differences across industries using the cyclical service 
industry as the reference industry, but can only be included in the random effects 
regressions 
 
a) Fixed effects regressions 
Estimates for the total board pay are shown in table 2 and those for the highest paid 
director in table 3.  We first compare the fixed effects regression model with a random 
effects model.  If the random effect model is consistent then this will give more 
efficient results then the fixed effects model, even though the fixed effects will still be 
consistent.  For the total board pay regressions, a Hausman test of random effects 
consistency gives a test statistic of 33.89, which means the null of consistent random 
effects can be rejected.  The Hausman test statistic for the highest paid director 
regressions is 107.36, so again the random effects model is rejected in favour of the 
fixed effects model.  Therefore the main regression analysis for both dependent 
variables will come from fixed effects models. 
 
Firm size has a much bigger effect on pay than firm return. In the fixed effects model 
the sales elasticity is around 0.2 for both pay variables which implies a 10% higher 
sales lead to roughly a 2% increase in pay so larger firms pay their boards/top director 
considerably more.  In comparison, the total shareholder return has a much smaller 
effect on executive pay.  This effect is slightly stronger for the pay of the highest paid 
director.  The coefficients in column1 of tables 2 and 3, suggest that a 10% increase in 
total shareholder return will lead to a 0.4% increase in total board pay and a 0.6% 
increase in the pay of the highest paid director.  A 10% increase in total sales and total 
shareholder return translates into a £35,752 and £7,150 increase in total board pay 
respectively at the median level of total board pay of £1,787,621. In the case of the 
pay of the highest paid director a 10% increase in sales and total shareholder return 
translates into a £10,145 and a £3,043 increase in highest paid director pay at the 
median level of £507,243.  Main et al (1996) also found a higher pay (cash 
compensation) performance elasticity for the highest paid director than for the total 
board pay. 
 
The shareholder return estimates for the highest paid director are comparable to 
Conyon (1997) and Benito and Conyon (1999), but than Conyon and Murphy (2000).  
Our estimates for total board pay are lower then Main et al (1996), who found 
estimates of around of 0.15 but this may reflect that their study only used a cross 
section of 60 large FTSE 100 firms.  
 
The coefficients for the time dummies in the basic fixed effects regression, although 
not reported in tables 2 and 3, are shown in Exhibit 2.
 5
 Most of the year dummy 
variables seem to be positively significant relative to the 1994/1995 fiscal year and the 
effect seems to get larger as you move through the years.  This implies that pay has 
been continually rising over time above inflation as was highlighted by figures 1 and 
2 in the descriptive statistics section.   
  
The time variables will be picking up any factors that change over time but are the 
same across all firms. Even after allowing for firm size and firm performance the 
growth in average total board pay has grown by 32% and that of the highest paid 
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 Exhibit 2: Time Dummy coefficients 
Fiscal 
Year 
Total Board 
Pay 
Highest Paid 
Director Pay 
1995/1996 0.0225 0.0694 
 [0.0234] [0.0276]* 
1996/1997 0.0764 0.1293 
 [0.0232]** [0.0274]** 
1997/1998 0.1008 0.1906 
 [0.0234]** [0.0276]** 
1998/1999 0.1172 0.208 
 [0.0234]** [0.0276]** 
1999/2000 0.2112 0.323 
 [0.0243]** [0.0286]** 
2000/2001 0.2813 0.3887 
 [0.0252]** [0.0297]** 
2001/2002 0.3134 0.428 
 [0.0257]** [0.0303]** 
Standard errors in brackets 
 
director has grown by 43%.  This highlights that much of the growth in directors’ pay 
can not be attributed to the individual firms performance.  This implies that corporate 
governance reports such as Greenbury (1995) that proposed that executive pay be 
more closely aligned with performance, have been ineffective.
 
 
 
The introduction of the industry dummies in the random effects model shows that 
there is some variation in pay levels among the industries though not all the industries 
are significantly different from the reference industry.  The reference industry is the 
cyclical services industry, with the largest number of firms from our sample.  Only the 
utilities and financials industries are significantly different from the reference industry 
and only financials receive more pay for both pay variables.  Financials pay their 
board 21.77% and their highest paid director 19.5% more then the cyclical industries.  
Whilst the utilities pay their whole board 24.75% and their highest paid director 
36.7% less..  These figures suggest there is strong variation in total pay across some 
industries although the random effects estimates may be inconsistent, but time 
invariant variables cannot be estimated under fixed effects regressions. 
 
As would be expected the number of directors has a positive effect on the total board 
pay since there are more (possible higher quality) directors to pay.  From the 
coefficients in column1, an increase in the board size by one director will increase 
total board pay by 6%.  From Table 3, the number of directors has a positive but 
insignificant effect on the pay of the highest paid director.  
 
The proportion of non-executive directors has opposite effects on the total board pay 
and the highest paid director pay though for the latter it is insignificant for the fixed 
effects models. As the proportion of non-executive directors increases the pay of the 
board goes down.  A 1% increase in the proportion of non-executives will reduce total 
board pay by 0.47%.  This may be simply because non-executives are paid less since 
they only receive directors’ fees so if there are a higher number of non-executives 
then overall pay will be less (holding board size constant).  On the other hand, the 
proportion of non-executives may be a proxy for the level of monitoring exerted by 
the board, so more monitoring (more non-executives) will lower total board pay. If 
this was the case one would expect the proportion of the non-executives to have a 
negative effect on the pay of the highest paid director.  Past studies such as Cosh 
(1997) and Core (1999) have found that the proportion of non-executives has a 
positive effect on CEO pay.  In Table 3, the effect is positive although insignificant.  
These results suggest that the size of the board and the composition of the board do 
not affect the level of pay for the highest paid director but do affect the pay of the 
whole board.  
 
We now turn to the effect of firm risk on the pay-performance relationship.  Aggarwal 
and Samwick (1999) and Garvey and Milbourn (2003) found that riskier firms tend to 
have lower pay-performance relationships and a smaller proportion of their pay as 
incentive based pay.  Since we have only data on cash compensation we can’t directly 
test the latter but we can look at the former.  The firm return was interacted with the 
cumulative density function of the firm’s variance of returns, as our measure of firm 
risk.   For each firm, the variance of daily returns for the previous account year was 
computed, except in the case of the first year where that years data was used.  These 
variances were then normalised using a cumulative density function (CDF). This 
enabled each firm to have a value between 0 and 1 so the firm with the most risk 
would have a CDF equal to 1. 
 
The coefficients on firm return and firm return interacted with the CDF are shown in 
column 3, of tables 2 and 3.   The CDF of firm risk is positive but insignificant in the 
fixed effects regression for both dependent variables, implying that the level of firm 
risk having no significant effect on the level of cash compensation.  When we include 
the interactive total shareholder return variable with CDF of firm risk the pay 
performance relationship changes slightly.  The coefficient on the ln(1 + return) is the 
pay performance relationship for a firm with no risk.  If we know where the firm lies 
in the return distribution then we can work out their pay performance relationship 
using the sum of the two coefficients.  From the coefficients in the raw return fixed 
effects regression model a firm with no risk (CDF=0), has a pay performance estimate 
of 0.1307 – a 10% increase in total shareholder return will lead to a 1.4% increase in 
cash compensation.  The coefficient on the interactive variable is –0.1134, so for a 
firm with the highest level of risk (CDF=1) their pay performance estimate would be 
0.1307-0.1134 = 0.0173.  For a firm that had the median level of risk (CDF=0.5) their 
pay performance elasticity would be 0.1307-(0.5*0.1134) = 0.074.  This demonstrates 
that firms with a higher level of risk tend to have lower pay performance 
relationships, as has been found previously.  
 
To allow for the potential endogeneity of the firm performance variable, we also 
estimated the regression using instrumental variable techniques. In the board pay 
regressions, when returns are instrumented by lagged returns reported in column 6 the 
return coefficient becomes larger than ordinary fixed effects but is insignificant.  
When the board pay regression is run using GMM the return coefficient increases to 
0.069. In the GMM regression the effect of total sales is reduced from 0.2 to 0.0929, 
but this may reflect that lagged total board pay is included in the regression and total 
sales in the other regressions will be picking up the persistence of pay.  Therefore the 
GMM regression shows as would be expected that there is some persistence in pay.  
The Hansen test shows that the null of invalid instruments can be rejected. In table 3 
using lagged returns as an instrument for returns in the column 6 the coefficient on 
return becomes negative and significant, suggesting that lagged returns are poor 
instruments. The GMM regression coefficient in column 7 on firm return is very 
similar to that from the fixed effects regression.  In both Tables 2 and 3 the Hansen 
test rejected the null of invalid instruments for the GMM models 
. 
b) Alternative measures of returns
6
  
We have seen that the raw firm return does have a large effect on directors pay.  But 
firms may do well because the whole market/industry is performing well.  Therefore 
columns 4 and 5 in tables 2 and 3 use market and industry adjusted returns.  If the 
market/industry is doing well, do firms take this into account before setting pay 
levels? Is executive compensation related to the out-performance of the firm relative 
to the market or industry?  For both pay variables it seems that market adjusted 
returns makes very little difference to the significance, sign and size of the return 
coefficients.  The industry adjusted return has a slightly larger effect but only makes a 
marginal difference.  In comparison with the earlier reported numbers, a 10% increase 
in total return above the market return from column 4 increases pay by £7,025; whilst 
a 10% return above the industry return from column 5 will lead to a £8,598.45 rise.  
Using similar information from Table 3, if return is greater then the market by 10%, 
                                                
6
 We also tried different measures of performance, namely accounting based methods such a s change 
in real sales, return on assets, real net EPS, profits but all these variables were insignificant 
the median highest paid director pay will increase by £3,033 and for a 10% increase 
above the industry return pay will rise by £3,566. It appears that firms do not use 
relative performance evaluation. 
 
c) Interactive Dummy Variables 
Our fixed effects estimates are an average across time, and companies that the 
coefficients relate to average estimates across time and companies.  Any pay 
estimated pay-performance relationship will only be an average one, but the pay-
performance relationship may vary across firms, time or industries or other factors.  
By including a set of interactive variables we may allow for the pay-performance 
relationship to vary across those variables.   
 
The inclusion of the firm return variable interacted with the year dummies allows us 
to see if the pay-performance relationship has changed over time for both pay 
variables.  The raw return firm variable was interacted with the year dummies in the 
regression along with the usual control variables and a full set of year dummies. 
 
Figure 5 shows how the pay-performance relationship has changed over the sample 
period using the estimates of the coefficients of the interactive dummy variables.  One 
might have expected that the pay-performance relationship would have increased over 
the sample period for both pay variables, following the proposals of the corporate 
governance reports suggesting pay and performance be linked more closely.   Over 
the whole sample period the performance elasticity has risen for both pay variables 
and by 2002 the elasticities were similar for both pay variables.  For the total board it 
has risen from –0.02 in 1995 to 0.066 in 2002 and for the highest paid director it has 
risen from 0.024 to 0.066.  But by 2002 these elasticities were not at a peak since 
there appears to be large fluctuations for both pay variables and the pay-performance 
relationship is not necessarily significant in each year.  The largest elasticities were in 
1997 and 1998 when the stock market was at its peak.  This implies that there is a 
strong relationship between pay and performance when stock markets are rising, but a 
much weaker relationship when stock prices are falling.  Since 2000 the performance 
elasticities have risen slightly despite the poor general performance of the stock 
market.   
 
Figure 5: Pay Performance Elasticity 1994/1995-2001/2002
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Fig. 5.  Pay performance elasticities 1994/1995-2001/2002 obtained from fixed effects regressions..  
Pay is cash compensation (salary, bonus and pension contributions) and is inflated upwards to 
2001/2002 fiscal year prices.  Performance is measured by total shareholder return. 
 
F-tests on the differences in these pay-performance elasticities were F(7, 2364) = 
0.63, F(7, 2360) = 0.73 for total pay and highest paid director respectively.  The F-test 
shows that the coefficients are not significantly different from each other across time 
for both total board pay and highest paid director.  This suggests that the interactive 
variables for both pay variables are not significantly different from each other so the 
pay-performance relationship has not appeared to have changed over time.  This may 
reflect that there is very little pay-performance with cash compensation. 
 
We may also examine how the pay size relationship has changed over time. 
Interactive dummy variables of sales and year dummies were included in the 
regression.  Figure 6 shows the pay size elasticities over the sample period. 
 
Figure 6: Pay size Elasticities 1995/1996-2001/2002
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Fig 6. Pay size elasticities 1994/1995-2001/2002 obtained from fixed effects regressions.  Pay is cash 
compensation (salary, bonus and pension contributions) and size is measured by total firm sales.  Both 
pay and sales are inflated upwards to 2001/2002 fiscal year prices. 
 
The pay size relationship has fallen slightly over the sample period for both pay 
variables.  In the 1994/1995 fiscal year the pay size elasticity was 0.2109 and 0.2040 
for total pay and that of the highest paid director respectively.  By the 2001/2002 they 
had fallen to 0.1660 and 0.1771 respectively.  This suggests there has been some 
change to the setting of executive compensation and the relationship between pay and 
size has fallen.  Murphy (1999) reports that the pay size relationship had fallen for 
executive compensation in the US.    
 
F-tests for the equality of the coefficients are F (7, 2364)=3.14 and F(7, 2360)=1.69 
for the total board pay and the pay of the highest paid director.  This suggests that 
there is no trend over time for the size sensitivity of the highest paid director but the 
pay-size sensitivity for total board pay has fallen.  The pay-size relationship still 
seems more robust then the pay-performance relationship even if it has fallen slightly 
over time. 
 
We also examined how the pay-performance relationship varied across different 
categories.  This was done in two ways.  Firstly for variables that varied across time 
interactive variables were included in the basic fixed effect regressions.  For variables 
that varied across firms but not across time pooled estimates of the pay-performance 
relationship were estimated using meta-analysis, a technique common in psychology 
and the medical sciences, and which is explained in Section d below. 
 
Table 4 shows the effect of interactive dummy variables, that varied across time. If 
directors are rewarded for good performance but not punished for bad performance 
one would expect the pay and performance relationship to be significant when 
performance is good and non-existence when performance is bad.  There was some 
suggestion of this in figure 5. This was tested by interacting the firm return variable 
with whether firms were below or above the median return of the sample firms in each 
fiscal year.  For both pay variables there does seem to be a difference between firms 
below and above median firm return.  The pay-performance relationship is significant 
for firms above median return but insignificant for those below.  For firms above 
median return the average pay-performance relationship is 0.0758 for the total board 
pay and 0.1217 for the highest paid director.  These estimates are higher then the 
average pay-performance relationships found in the original fixed effect regressions.  
Although not reported results were identical when the return was interacted with 
whether firms are above or below the return on the FTSE all share index in the given 
fiscal year. 
 
Next, the firm return was interacted with whether the fiscal year was before or after 
the stock market down turn of March 2000. The relationship has become stronger for 
both pay variables after the stock market fall.  This suggests that firms were receiving 
pay based on the performance of the whole market when the market was booming, 
and then based on their own performance after the stock market crashed.  
Alternatively this may reflect that firms are under more pressure to comply with the 
corporate governance reports when the stock market is in decline. 
 
The third set of interactive variables look at the size of firms by total sales, split by 
whether the firms were above or below median total sales in the particular fiscal year.  
There appears to be a stronger pay-performance relationship for larger firms.  This 
contrasts with past research e.g. Jensen and Murphy (1990), Conyon and Sadler 
(2001). 
d) Meta-analysis 
Individual pay-performance estimates were calculated for each firm using interactive 
firm dummies, which gives an estimate of the average pay-performance relationship 
across time for each firm.  Firms with less then five years worth of data were excluded 
from this type of analysis since it was deemed the time period was not sufficient to 
provide meaningful estimates. 
 
Once we have estimates for each firm we can pool them in any way we wish.  Since 
each firm has only a few observations standard errors are likely to be high so simply 
taking the arithmetic mean would lead to inefficient estimates.  Meta-analysis will 
provide much better estimates since it weights each estimate according to their 
standard error so estimates with higher standard errors will have less weighting in the 
average estimate.  For a description of meta-analysis and its application see Hedges 
and Vevea (1998) and Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000).   
 
Descriptive statistics for the individual firm pay-performance estimates for both pay 
variables can be found in table 5.   From the standard deviations it is clear there is 
some degree of variation in individual estimates, particularly since the standard 
deviations are greater then the mean.  This reflects the fact that many firms (around 
40%) had negative performance estimates.  Table 6 reports the pooled estimates using 
meta-analysis techniques.  The pooling of all the individual estimates give different 
results then the mean pay-performance elasticities in table 5.  This reflects the fact 
that meta-analysis weights each observation.  These meta-analysis estimates are 
comparable to the average estimate across time and firms that would be obtained from 
a fixed effect regression. 
 
The first variable used to group the individual estimates is industry group.  Since the 
cyclical goods only had seven observations this was grouped with the cyclical 
consumer services.  There seems to be a difference in the average pay-performance 
across industries but most of the estimates are insignificant.  The utility industry has 
the biggest pay-performance relationship for both pay variables of 0.325 and 0.447 for 
the total board and highest paid director respectively.  This is much larger then the 
average for all industries of 0.038 and 0.056.  For the total board pay the utility, 
cyclical consumer goods and services and financial industries have significant 
positive pay-performance elasticities.  For the highest paid director the general, utility 
and cyclical consumer goods and services industries had positive significant pay-
performance elasticities.  For the majority of industries there does not appear to be 
any pay-performance relationship and some such as the non-cyclical consumer goods 
and services even have negative although insignificant relationships.   
 
We then aggregated the individual estimates by various board structure variables.  It 
should be noted that the number of directors (executives and non-executives) and the 
proportion of non executives present on the board were averages for each firm over 
the sample period since the pay-performance estimates were averages over this 
period. 
 
The firms were pooled over whether on average over the sample period thay had more 
then or less than half their board composed of non-executive directors. Estimates were 
slightly higher for those with a proportion of non-executive directors of greater then 
50% of 0.045, which was significant.  Those with less then 50% had an insignificant 
estimate of 0.032 for total board pay.  The estimates for the highest paid director were 
very similar regardless of the proportion of non-executive directors. 
 
Estimates were pooled according to the size of the board split by whether the number 
of directors was above or below the sample average number of directors.  Firms with 
larger boards tended to have higher pay-performance relationships for both total board 
pay and highest paid director pay.  Estimates were also pooled according to whether 
the number of non-executive directors was greater or less then the sample average.  
Just because a firm has more non-executives than the average does not imply they 
have a higher proportion of non-executives to executives. This is a slightly different 
measure to the proportion of non-executive directors on the board.  The results show 
that firms that had more non-executives than the average had a higher pay-
performance relationship than those below the average for both total board pay and 
that of the highest paid director.  This again emphasises that the structure and size of 
the board does have some influence on the relationship between pay and performance. 
 
VI Conclusions 
The objective of this paper has been to examine the determinants of both total board 
pay and the pay of the highest paid director, and to examine how this relationship has 
changed over time.  In particular we were interested in the pay-performance 
relationship using total shareholder return as our main measure of performance.  Our 
pay measure included salary, bonus and pension contributions.   A caveat to our 
results is that pay variables did not include incentive payment, but given the increase 
in basic cash compensation over the period of study, it is relevant to examine whether 
there is any link between the basic pay of executives and the performance of the 
company, during a time of extreme stock price volatility and against a back-drop of a 
series of corporate governance reports.   
 
The preferred estimation method was fixed effects regression to allow for the 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms.  The main findings were that firm size has a 
dominant effect in determining the level of executive compensation, consistent with 
the results of previous studies.  One explanation is that larger firms need higher 
quality directors and need higher pay levels to attract them.  Pay levels in the US are 
much higher than in the UK, and therefore large UK firms need to pay more to attract 
mangers in an international managerial labour market. 
 
The board structure variables had an effect on total board pay but not on the pay of the 
highest paid director.  Firms with more directors have higher total board pay and pay 
will be less if there is a higher percent of non-executives.  
 
The fixed effects regressions identified a slight relationship between the pay and 
performance of the company with estimates being slightly stronger for the highest 
paid director.  There was no evidence of any relative performance evaluation as 
measured by the abnormal performance of the company, as distinct from the raw 
stock market returns, which includes general stock market movements. There was 
some evidence that industry adjusted returns may pay some role in setting executive 
pay.  
 
We also explored the heterogeneity in the pay-performance relationship across firms. 
Following the publication of a series of corporate governance reports throughout the 
‘nineties we expected to find an increase in these elasticities over time, since a 
common theme of these reports is that executive pay should be related to company 
performance. However we identified an asymmetric relationship between pay and 
performance. We found that pay-performance elasticities were high when stock 
returns where relatively high, but that pay is less sensitive to performance when stock 
returns are low. This suggests that over time and across firms there is little 
relationship between pay and performance.  There is some evidence that the 
relationship appeared to get stronger after the stock market crash of March 2000.   
 
In conclusion, there is evidence that the pay-performance relationship for cash 
compensation does vary across firms, industries, firm size and board size and 
structure variables and the level of firm risk.  The average estimates for all firms and 
across time highlight that even before the inclusion of incentive pay, executive pay 
has risen greatly over our sample period, but with little relationship between pay and 
performance.  This is in direct contrast to the recommendations of various corporate 
governance reports, that have advocated a relationship between pay and performance. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Pay Variables 
Variable No of 
Obs 
Mean Std.Dev Median Growth in 
Mean 1995-
2002 (%) 
Real Total Board Pay (£'000) 2857 2421.881 2167.771 1787.621 32.67 
Real Highest Paid Director 
Pay (£'000) 
2851 680.031 696.419 507.243 60.18 
Panel B: Firm Size Variables 
Variable No of 
Obs 
Mean Std.Dev Median Growth in 
Mean 1995-
2002 (%) 
Real Market Capitalisation 
(£m) 
2859 3147.979 9892.754 659.745 87.70 
Real Total Sales (£’000) 2826 2318285 5638000 634061.3 25.47 
Panel C: Return Variables    
Variable No of 
Obs 
Mean Std.Dev Median  
Firm Total Shareholder 
Return 
2859 0.1824 0.7545 0.0902  
CAPM Market adjusted Firm 
Return  
2859 0.12065 0.7469 0.0230  
CAPM Industry adjusted 
Firm Return 
2859 0.11997 0.7164 0.0290  
Real Net EPS (pence) 2824 18.94 65.04 17.72  
Real Return on Assets 2826 0.0678 0.1944 0.0768  
Panel D: Board Structure    
Variable No of 
Obs 
Mean Std.Dev Median Mean 1995 
No of Directors 2852 9.5 2.9 9 9.43 
No of Executive Directors 2836 4.78 1.92 5 5.2 
No of Non-Executive 
Directors 
2836 4.71 2.1 4 4.21 
Proportion of Non-
Executives (%) 
2836 0.494 0.138 0.5 0.44 
For definitions of all variables see appendix 1. All real variables are inflated upwards to 2001/2002 fiscal 
year prices 
Table 2:  Total Board Cash Compensations Regressions  
Dependent variable is ln(Total Board Pay) 
  Fixed Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects with 
Firm Risk CAPM 
Industry 
CAPM 
Fixed 
Effects IV  GMM 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.2016 0.2149 0.2024 0.2019 0.2027 0.216 0.0929ln(Total sales) 
[0.0137]** [0.0091]** [0.0137]** [0.0137]** [0.0136]** [0.0219]** [0.0163]**
0.0417 0.0429 0.1307   0.0744 0.0686ln(1 + firm return) 
[0.0129]** [0.0129]** [0.03097]**   [0.1899] [0.0167]**
   0.0393   ln(1+ market adjusted 
return)    [0.0125]**   
    0.0481  ln(1+ industry adjusted 
return)     [0.0134]**  
-0.4678 -0.5217 -0.4694 -0.4715 -0.4763 -0.4268 -0.4541% of non-executives 
[0.0716]** [0.0651]** [0.0716]* [0.0716]** [0.0718]** [0.0800]** [0.0777]**
0.0622 0.0687 0.0623 0.0622 0.0628 0.0556 0.0557No of Directors 
[0.0043]** [0.0039]** [0.0043]** [0.0044]** [0.0043]** [0.0062]** [0.0068]**
lag total board pay       0.4901
       [0.0601]**
CDF Firm Risk   0.0213    
   [0.0290]    
  -0.1134    CDF Firm Risk* ln (1 + 
firm return)   [0.0481]**    
 0.0374     Resources 
 [0.0973]     
 -0.0305     Basic Industries 
 [0.0557]     
 0.0062     General Industries 
 [0.0598]     
 0.1659     Cyclical Consumer Goods 
 [0.1341]     
 0.0763     Non-Cyclical Consumer 
Goods  [0.0611]     
 -0.0172     Non-Cyclical Services 
 [0.0950]     
 -0.2475     Utilities 
 [0.0922]**     
 0.2177     Financials 
 [0.0539]**     
 -0.1318     Information Technology 
 [0.0822]     
Constant 4.30 4.07 4.2811 4.30 4.29 4.4358 2.2447
 [0.1740]** [0.1157]** [0.1754]** [0.1739]** [0.1736]** [0.2774]** [0.2399]**
Observations 2794 2794 2794 2793 2786 2378 2378
Hansen Test       36.91
Number of firms 410 410 410 410 410 410 410
R-squared 0.35  0.35 0.35 0.35  
Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Time dummies are included but not reported 
 
 
Table 3: Highest Paid Director Cash Compensation Regressions 
Dependent variable is ln (Highest paid director’s pay) 
  Fixed Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects with 
Firm Risk CAPM 
Industry 
CAPM 
Fixed 
Effects IV  GMM 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.1979 0.2065 0.1987 0.1981 0.1979 0.1425 0.1112ln(Total sales) 
[0.0161]** [0.0107]** [0.0161]** [0.0161]** [0.0160]** [0.0409]** [0.0174]**
0.0628 0.0638 0.1412   -0.808 0.0681ln(1 + firm return) 
[0.0152]** [0.0152]** [0.0468]**   [0.3546]* [0.0180]**
   0.0598   ln(1+ market adjusted 
return)    [0.0147]**   
    0.0703  ln(1+ industry adjusted 
return)     [0.0159]**  
0.1631 0.207 0.1615 0.1583 0.1522 0.1792 0.189Proportion of non-
executives [0.0847] [0.0767]** [0.0847] [0.0847] [0.0849] [0.1516] [0.1013]
0.0018 0.0076 0.0019 0.002 0.002 -0.0193 0.0167No of Directors 
[0.0051] [0.0046] [0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0115] [0.0064]**
lag highest paid pay       0.4253
       [0.0548]**
CDF Firm Risk   0.0217    
   [0.0342]    
  -0.0995    CDF Firm Risk* ln (1 + 
firm return)   [0.0567]    
 -0.0166     Resources 
 [0.1149]     
 -0.0852     Basic Industries 
 [0.0657]     
 0.0008     General Industries 
 [0.0706]     
 0.2075     Cyclical Consumer Goods 
 [0.1583]     
 0.0438     Non-cyclical Consumer 
Goods  [0.0721]     
 -0.0964     Non-cyclical Services 
 [0.1121]     
 -0.3673     Utilities 
 [0.1088]**     
 0.1945     Financials 
 [0.0637]**     
 -0.1884     Information Technology 
 [0.0971]     
Constant 3.28 3.09 3.2566 3.27 3.28 4.3471 2.0406
 [0.2052]** [0.1363]** [0.2069]** [0.2051]** [0.2049]** [0.5173]** [0.1911]**
Observations 2790 2790 2790 2789 2782 2376 2373
Hansen Test       38.5
Number of firms 410 410 410 410 410 410 410
R-squared 0.28  0.28 0.28 0.28  
Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Time dummies are included but not reported 
 Table 4: Coefficients on interactive return variables, by median 
Interactive 
Regression 
  
Variable interacted with firm return  Total Board 
Pay 
Highest paid 
Director 
0.0758 0.1217 Firms with return above median return in 
fiscal year [0.0229]** [0.0269]** 
0.0074 0.0038 
Firm Return 
Firms with return below median return in 
fiscal year [0.0229] [0.0270] 
0.0351 0.0639 Good stock market performance fiscal 
year<2001 [0.0180] [0.0211]** 
0.0499 0.0614 
Stock Market 
Performance 
Poor stock market performance fiscal 
year>2000 [0.0204]* [0.0240]* 
0.0931 0.123 Firms above median sales 
[0.0228]** [0.0269]** 
0.019 0.0364 
Firm Size 
Firms below median sales 
[0.0153] [0.0180]* 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the individual firm pay-performance elasticities 
Variable N Mean Median St.Dev 25% 75%
Total 
Board Pay 368 0.052777 0.057118 0.4913639 -0.10781 0.217937
Highest 
Paid 
Director 368 0.0918 0.061814 0.5282505 -0.12276 0.289354
 
Table 6: Pooled pay-performance coefficients using meta-analysis 
Variable estimates are pooled 
across No of obs 
Total 
Board 
Pay 
Highest 
paid 
Director 
363 0.038 0.056 All 
 (3.055)** (3.734)** 
13 0.049 0.113 Resources 
 -0.713 -1.351 
51 0.065 0.089 Basic Industries 
 -1.229 -1.372 
42 0.078 0.118 General Industries 
 -1.847 (2.292)* 
124 0.045 0.082 Cyclical Consumer Goods and 
services  (2.136)* (3.199)** 
37 -0.005 -0.008 Non-cyclical Consumer Goods 
 (-0.150) (-0.178) 
15 -0.039 -0.025 Non-cyclical services 
 (-0.894) (-0.483) 
13 0.325 0.447 Utilities 
 (3.053)** (3.446)** 
51 0.099 0.092 Financials 
 (2.486)* -1.881 
17 0.003 -0.013 Information Technology 
 -0.103 (-0.351) 
184 0.045 0.055 Proportion of non-exs>0.5 
 (2.497)* (2.884)* 
184 0.032 0.052 Proportion of non-exs<0.5 
 -1.804 (2.383)* 
161 0.066 0.083 Larger Boards 
 (2.909)* (3.009)** 
202 0.026 0.045 Smaller Boards 
 -1.757 (2.502)* 
151 0.051 0.084 Above average number of non-
exs  (2.332)* (3.153)** 
212 0.031 0.043 Below average  number of non-
exs   (2.105)* (2.366)* 
Z scores in brackets    
* significant at 5%, **significant at 1%  
 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of Variables 
 
Accounting Year 
This is the individual firms accounting year as given by the year ends from 
Datastream 
Fiscal Year 1995-
2002 
Set of fiscal years which firms account year is matched up with - used 
as year dummy variables in regression  
FTSE Index Index the company was in at the end of the firms accounting year - 
FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE small cap, FTSE fledgling or  FTSE aim 
Indgroup1-10 A set of 10 sector groups as detailed in Appendix 3 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Market capitalisation of the firm at the end of the accounting year – 
£m (source: Hemscott trading dataset) 
Total Sales Total sales - £'000 (Datastream code 104) 
Total Board Pay  Total pay of all directors of the firm board -£'000  (Datastream code 
126)  
Highest Paid 
Director Pay 
Remuneration of the highest paid director -£'000 (Datastream code 
244) 
Firm Return This is the individual firms total shareholder return by accounting year 
(source: Hemscott trading dataset) 
FTSE All Share Value of the FTSE all share -£ (Datastream) 
FTSE All Share 
Return 
Total annual return of FTSE all share index by firms accounting year 
(Datastream)  
Firm market 
adjusted return 
The firms abnormal return for the firms accounting year using 
expected returns from our CAPM model - explained in section 3b 
Firm industry 
adjusted return 
The firms abnormal return for the firms accounting year using 
expected returns from our Industry CAPM model - explained in 
section 3b 
No of Directors The total number of directors in the firm in the accounting 
(Datastream code 242) 
No of non-
executives 
The number of non- executive directors in the firms accounting year 
(Datastream code 243) 
No of executives No of directors - No non-executives 
% of non-executives This is the proportion of the whole board which comprises of non-
executive directors, no of non-executives/no of directors  
Pre- tax profit   Pre tax profits -£'000 (Datastream code 154)  
Net EPS  Net earnings per share – p (Datastream code 254) 
Standard Deviation 
of Returns 
Standard deviation of firms daily return based on previous accounting 
year 
All monetary variables inflated upwards to 2001/12002 fiscal year prices using Retail price index 
(source: www.stastistics.gov.uk) 
 
Appendix 2: Characteristics of Sample 
 
Panel A: Construction of Sample 
Total Population of 
FTSE350 stocks 
during 1994-2002 571 
Unavailable Data 72 
Less then 3 years 84 
Firms in sample 415 
 
Panel B: Number of Firms per Year 
Account Year 
Number 
of Firms 
1994/1995 267 
1995/1996 343 
1996/1997 361 
1997/1998 377 
1998/1999 380 
1999/2000 371 
2000/2001 353 
2001/2002 347 
2002/2003 60 
 
Panel C: Distribution of the number of observations per firm 
No of 
Account 
Years Freq. Percent 
3 17 4.1 
4 30 7.23 
5 41 9.88 
6 45 10.84 
7 43 10.36 
8 239 57.59 
Total 415 100 
Appendix 3: Industry/Sector Groups 
 
Panel A:Industry Group Definitions 
1 Resources (Including Mining, Oil & Gas) 
2 Basic Industries (Chemicals, Construction, Forestry, Steel) 
3 General Industrials (Aerospace, diversified indusrials, Electronic & Electrical, Engineering) 
4 Cyclical Consumer Goods (Automobiles, Household Goods & Textiles) 
5 Non-cyclical Con. Goods (Beverages, Food, Health, Personal Care, Pharmaceuticals, Tobacco) 
6 Cyclical Service (General retailers, Leisure, Media, Support Services, Transport) 
7 Non-cyclical Services (Food & drug Retailers, Telecommunications) 
8 Utilities (Electricity, Gas, Water) 
9 Financials (banks, Insurance, Real Estate, speciality Finance) 
10 Information Technology (IT Hardware, IT Software & Computer Services) 
 
 
Panel B:Distribution of industry group 
indgroup Freq. Percent 
1 14 3.37 
2 52 12.53 
3 49 11.81 
4 6 1.45 
5 45 10.84 
6 132 31.81 
7 16 3.86 
8 20 4.82 
9 59 14.22 
10 22 5.3 
Total 415 100 
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